We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of alternatives: by comparison of worst alternatives, best alternatives, or by comparison based on stochastic dominance. We perform a similar exercise for k-approval rules, where voters approve of a fixed number k of alternatives. These results can be used to compare (k-)approval rules with respect to their manipulability. Analytical results are obtained for the case of two voters, specifically, the values of k for which the k-approval rule is minimally manipulable -has the smallest number of manipulable preference profiles -under the various preference extensions are determined. For the number of voters going to infinity, an asymptotic result is that the kapproval rule with k around half the number of alternatives is minimally manipulable among all scoring rules. Further results are obtained by simulation and indicate that k-approval rules may improve on the approval rule as far as manipulability is concerned.
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Introduction
Approval voting is a well accepted voting procedure. 1 In approval voting each voter can approve of as many alternatives as he wants. It is well known (Brams and Fishburn, 1983 , and the references therein) that this procedure is strategyproof (non-manipulable) if preferences are dichotomous, that is, each voter distinguishes only between a set of good and a set of bad alternatives. With more refined preferences, however, strategy-proofness no longer holds.
In this paper we study the manipulability of the approval (voting) rule and of a related procedure called k-approval (voting) rule. In a k-approval rule each voter approves of exactly k alternatives. This procedure is less flexible than the approval rule -voters can provide less information about their preferences -but tends to be also less manipulable, as we will argue. Therefore, k-approval rules may offer a good compromise between the approval rule and scoring rules such as Borda count.
In Section 2 we introduce the approval rule and next we study its manipulability. Since the approval rule (and also each k-approval rule) is a social choice correspondence and can be multi-valued, we need to make assumptions about extending the preferences (weak orderings) of voters over alternatives to sets of alternatives. We do this in three ways: by comparing the worst alternatives of a set, or by comparing the best alternatives of a set, or by comparing sets on the basis of stochastic dominance using equal chances. In Section 3 we characterize the non-manipulable preference profiles under approval voting for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. The special cases of strict preferences follow as corollaries. Strategy-proofness under dichotomous preferences follows as a special case as well.
In Section 4 we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under k-approval rules, again for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. We also include a brief consideration of a lexicographic refinement of worst and best comparison. For technical reasons attention in Section 4 is restricted to strict preferences.
The main purpose of all these exercises is to compare the approval rule and kapproval rules for different values of k with respect to manipulability and under different assumptions about the voters' preferences on sets of alternatives. This comparison is based on a simple measure, namely the number of manipulable preference profiles. The implicit assumption is therefore that all profiles are equally likely. This is called 'impartial culture' in the literature. Unfortunately, a complete analytical comparison is out of the question due to the combinatorial complexity of the problem. For this reason, our comparative results are mainly based on simulations and, thus, they are conjectures and suggestions rather than theorems. A selection of the results of these simulations is presented in Section 5. They give rise to some prudent conclusions concerning the manipulability of the approval and k-approval rules under different assumptions on preference extensions. In particular, they give support to the conjecture that k-approval rules for specific values of k may be less susceptible to manipulation than the approval rule.
Nevertheless, we also present some analytical comparison results. In Section 4.4 we consider the two-voter case and compute the optimal k for different preference extensions, that is, the value of k for which the k-approval rule is minimally manipulable. For k = 1, the k-approval rule is just plurality voting. In the two-voter case, this is non-manipulable (strategy-proof) under any reasonable preference extension, including those considered in this paper. Plurality voting, however, has a serious drawback. If (the) two voters agree on a good second-ranked alternative but disagree on the first, then under plurality voting this compromise is not chosen; it would be chosen, however, under any other k-approval rule. Therefore, for each of the three mentioned preference comparisons and for k = 1 we have established the overall optimal value of k, and the optimal value under the restriction k ≤ m/2, where m is the total the number of alternatives. The latter restriction is justified by the desirable property of 'citizen sovereignty': for each alternative there is a preference profile resulting in that alternative as the unique outcome. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2 we find k = 2 as the optimal value in case of best or stochastic dominance comparison, and k ≈ √ m in case of worst comparison.
On the other extreme, in Section 4.6 we let the number of voters go to infinity and show that even among all scoring rules the k-approval rule with k ∈ {(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} if m is odd, and with k = m/2 if m is even, is minimally manipulable. Of course, this result should be interpreted with care, since the probability of manipulability by a single voter is very small anyway if the number of voters is large. The basic intuition for this result is that the (statistical) variance in scores is maximal for the mentioned value(s) of k, so that any single voter's probability of being able to change the outcome is minimal.
Related literature In most voting situations agents have the possibility to manipulate the outcome of the vote by not voting according to their true preferences. The classical theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) formalizes this fact for social choice functions, which assign a unique alternative to every preference profile, but it also holds for social choice correspondences under various assumptions on preference extensions to sets (e.g., Barberà, Dutta, and Sen, 2001) . The present paper belongs to the strand of literature, initiated by Kelly (1988 Kelly ( , 1989 , which accepts this phenomenon as a matter of fact and looks for social choice rules which are second best in this respect, i.e., least manipulable. Other references include Fristrup and Keiding (1998) and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) . Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2007) contains a brief overview of this literature.
Of course, counting the non-manipulable profiles is just one way of measuring the degree of (non-)manipulability of voting rules. Many other approaches are possible (e.g., Saari, 1990, or recently Campbell and Kelly, 2008) . As already mentioned, our measure of non-manipulability reflects 'impartial culture': each preference profile is implicitly regarded as equally likely. The characterizations of the sets of non-manipulable profiles derived in this paper, however, are also needed when considering 'partial culture'.
Notation We denote the cardinality of a set D by |D|.
Approval voting
The set of voters is N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 and the (finite) set of alternatives is A with |A| = m ≥ 3. A preference is a weak ordering on A, i.e., a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation on A. By W we denote the set of all preferences. A preference profile w is a function from N to W , i.e., an element of W N . For a preference profile w, w(i) is the preference of voter i ∈ N . For a non-empty subset B of A, w(i) |B denotes the restriction of w(i) to the set B, i.e., w(i) |B 
We next introduce some further notation. Let w be a preference profile and i ∈ N . Let 1 ≤ ≤ m and suppose there exists a set of alternatives B with |B| = , (x, y) ∈ w(i) and (y, x) / ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ B and y ∈ A \ B. Then we denote this set by β (w(i)). Observe that β (w(i)) exists if and only if there are alternatives strictly preferred to the remaining m − alternatives according to w(i); that is, β (w(i)) contains only full indifference classes of w(i).
Also, for a subset B of A, by β(w(i) |B ) we denote the set of best elements of B according to w
Observe that a ∈ L(a, w(i)) by reflexivity of w(i).
In approval voting, each voter i ∈ N approves of k(i) alternatives, where 1 ≤ k(i) ≤ m is the choice of the voter. The outcome of the vote is the set of those alternatives that receive the largest number of votes. (Observe that excluding k(i) = 0 is without loss of generality since the option k(i) = m is available.) To formalize this, a report of voter i is a pair r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) ∈ W ×{1, . . . , m} such that β k(i) (w(i)) exists. This implies that if a voter approves of an alternative x he also has to approve of all alternatives which are indifferent or strictly preferred to x according to w(i). By R we denote the set of all reports, and by R N the set of all (report) profiles. We denote by score(x, r) = |{i ∈ N | x ∈ β k(i) (w(i))}| the number of voters who approve of alternative x ∈ A at profile r = (w, k) = ((w(i), k(i))) i∈N ∈ R N . The approval rule ϕ, defined by
assigns to each profile r the subset of alternatives with maximal score.
We need a few more notations. For r = (w, k) ∈ R N and i ∈ N , ϕ(r −i ) denotes the set of alternatives assigned by the approval rule to the restricted profile r −i = (r 1 , ..., r i−1 , r i+1 , ..., r n ) ∈ R N \{i} , that is,
is the (possibly empty) set of those alternatives that have score one less than the elements of ϕ(r −i ). We call the alternatives in ϕ(r −i ) quasi-winners and those in ϕ − (r −i ) almost quasi-winners. 2 These notations are convenient in view of the following straightforward observation, which will be used throughout the next section:
(1)
In order to define (non-)manipulability of the approval rule at particular profiles we need to be able to extend individual preferences to preferences over non-empty subsets of alternatives. For a voter i in N and a preference w(i) ∈ W , we say that a binary relation w w(i) and ∼ w(i) denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of w(i) , respectively.
In this paper we will consider (three or even more) different ways to extend w(i) over alternatives to a binary relation over non-empty sets of alternatives. Suppose that w(i) extends w(i) for all i ∈ N . For i ∈ N and r, s ∈ R N , we say that r and
The approval rule ϕ is manipulable by voter i at r = (w, k) towards s if r and s are i-deviations and ϕ(s) w(i) ϕ(r). The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r if for all voters i there is no i-deviation s such that ϕ is manipulable by i at r towards s.
Manipulability of approval voting
The purpose of this section is to characterize the (report) profiles at which the approval rule is not manipulable, for three different preference extensions.
Worst comparison
In this subsection we extend preferences to sets by considering worst alternatives of those sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈ W , then we define the extension w(i) by
for all non-empty sets B, C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever every worst element of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every worst element of C.
Theorem 3.1 Let r = (w, k) ∈ R N . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following two statements holds:
In words, condition (a) requires that if among the quasi-winners there are alternatives belonging to the k(i) highest ranked alternatives of voter i, then i is indifferent between those alternatives; and (b) requires that voter i is indifferent between all quasi-winners.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r.
In case (a), it follows by (1) 
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i. Observe that either there exist
In both cases, by (1), x, y ∈ ϕ (r). Now consider the report s (i) = (w (i) , 1) of voter i such that β (w (i)) = {x}. Then, by (1) again, ϕ (s) = {x} w(i) ϕ (r).
We now consider the subclass of strict of preferences. This will enable us to compare approval voting to k-approval voting, which is studied in the next section.
Strict preferences
A preference w(i) is strict (or a linear ordering) if it is antisymmetric, i.e., (x, y) ∈ w(i) implies (y, x) / ∈ w(i) for all x, y ∈ A with x = y. Let P denote the set of all linear orderings on A, and S the set of all reports (w(i), k(i)) with w(i) ∈ P . The following result considers manipulability of the approval rule ϕ when restricted to S N .
Corollary 3.2 Let r = (w, k) ∈ S N . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to S N , is not manipulable at r under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following two statements holds:
Proof. For the only-if direction, note that if voter i can manipulate via a preference in W , then i can also manipulate by a strict preference, by strictifying the weak preference in any arbitrary way. Thus, the only-if direction follows from Theorem 3.1. The if-direction is immediate from Theorem 3.1.
Best comparison
In this subsection we extend preferences to sets by considering best alternatives of those sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈ W , then we define the extension w(i) by 3
for all non-empty sets B, C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever every best element of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every best element of C.
The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following two statements holds:
In words, condition (a) requires that any best alternative among the quasiwinners is preferred by i over all almost quasi-winners; and (b) requires that none of the quasi-winners is among his k (i) highest ranked alternatives, but some of the almost quasi-winners are among his k (i) highest ranked alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r.
In case (a), it follows by (1) that there exists
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i.
For strict preferences we have the following corollary. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Corollary 3.4 Let r = (w, k) ∈ S N . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to S N , is not manipulable at r under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following two statements holds:
Stochastic dominance comparison
In this subsection comparisons of sets of alternatives are based on stochastic dominance. To formalize this we need some further notions. Let u be a function from A to R. Then u is said to be a utility function representing preference w(i) of voter i, if for all alternatives x and y in A
Let B and C be two nonempty subsets of alternatives. Voter i is said to prefer B to C according to stochastic dominance at preference
This preference extension 4 is based on the idea that, if we attach equal probabilities to the alternatives in each set, then the expected utility of the resulting lottery over B should be at least as high as the expected utility of the resulting lottery over C, for each utility function representing p(i). Clearly, and in contrast to worst and best comparison in the preceding sections, this preference extension is not complete: many sets are incomparable. Observe that our notion of manipulability implies that a voter manages to obtain a preferred and thus comparable set.
In the following theorem we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under the stochastic dominance preference extension. To understand the proof, it is sometimes convenient to keep in mind the familiar characterization (or definition) of stochastic dominance involving only probabilities. This characterization says that a lottery is preferred over another lottery if it can be obtained by shifting probability in to preferred alternatives.
Theorem 3.5 Let r = (w, k) ∈ R N . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r under stochastic dominance if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three statements holds:
In words, these three cases can be described as follows. In case (a), no quasiwinner but at least one almost quasi-winner belongs to the k(i) highest ranked alternatives. In case (b) there are quasi-winners among the k (i) highest ranked alternatives and voter i is indifferent between them, but there are also lower ranked quasi-winners. In case (c) voter i is indifferent between the quasiwinners, and all almost quasi-winners are lower ranked than some of the quasiwinners.
For a proof of this theorem see the Appendix.
The following corollary (proof omitted) applies to strict preferences.
Corollary 3.6 Let r = (w, k) ∈ S N . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to S N , is not manipulable at r under stochastic dominance comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three statements holds:
Dichotomous preferences
A preference w(i) ∈ W is dichotomous if it has two indifference classes, i.e., there are disjoint subsets
is the cardinality of the higher indifference class of w(i), i.e., k(i) = |B 1 | in the notation above 5 . A report r(i) ∈ R d is called dichotomous as well. In the following corollary we show that the approval rule is strategy-proof when restricted to dichotomous report profiles, under all three preference extensions considered in this paper: this means that ϕ is manipulable at no r ∈ R N d under any of these preference extensions. This result confirms well known results on approval voting, see Brams and Fishburn (1983) and the references therein.
Corollary 3.7 The approval rule ϕ, restricted to R N d , is strategy-proof under the worst, best, and stochastic dominance preference extensions. and, clearly, {x} ∼ w(j) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r −j )∩β k(j) (w (j)). Hence, (a) holds for j. Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof under worst comparison.
Next, suppose that (a) in Theorem 3.3 does not hold for some
Finally, suppose (c) in Theorem 3.5 does not hold for some i ∈ N . There are two cases. If the first statement in (c) does not hold, then ϕ( 
Manipulability of k-approval voting
A variation on approval voting is obtained by fixing the number of alternatives that has to be approved by each voter. Specifically, for a profile p ∈ P N of strict preferences, an alternative x ∈ A, and a number k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, we denote by the k-score
the total number of voters for who alternative x is among the k first ranked alternatives at a profile p. The k-approval rule ϕ k , defined by
assigns to each profile p the subset of alternatives with maximal k-score. 6 Observe that it is, indeed, convenient to restrict attention to strict preferences, since otherwise we might have to split up indifference classes due to the fact that the number of alternatives to be approved is now fixed.
The sets ϕ k (p −i ) and ϕ − k (p −i ) of quasi-winners and almost quasi-winners are defined analogously as for the approval rule. Also, we have the following useful observation:
In what follows we characterize the profiles of preferences at which the kapproval rule is not manipulable for different preference extensions, starting with worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. The definitions of (non)-manipulability of ϕ k at a profile p are completely analogous to those for the approval rule.
Worst comparison
For the definition of the worst comparison preference extension see Section 3.1.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is not manipulable under worst comparison.
Theorem 4.1 Let p ∈ P N . The k-approval rule ϕ k is not manipulable at p under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three statements holds:
In words, condition (a) requires that exactly one of that voter i's k highest ranked alternatives is a quasi-winner; (b) requires that there is a unique quasiwinner; and (c) requires that the quasi-winners are a strict subset of the m − k lowest ranked alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For the if-part, let i ∈ N and let q be an i-deviation of p. Assume that at least one of the cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. We show that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.
In case (a), let
In case (b), let ϕ k (p −i ) = {x} for some alternative x. If x ∈ β k (p(i)) we are done by case (a). If x / ∈ β k (p(i)) then by (2), ϕ k (p) = {x}∪ ϕ − k (p −i ) ∩ β k (p(i)) and, thus, ω(p(i) |ϕ k (p) ) = x. Further, also by (2), ϕ k (q) = {x} or ϕ k (q) = {x} ∪ ϕ − k (p −i ) ∩ β k (q(i)) ; in both cases, (x, ω(p(i) |ϕ k (q) )) ∈ p(i) and, thus,
In case (c), by (2) 
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the three cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ k is manipulable at profile p by voter i. For this, in turn, it is sufficient to prove that i can manipulate at profile p for the following two cases.
. Take q(i) such that the positions in p(i) of b and one of the alternatives in β k (p(i)) are swapped. Then ϕ k (q) = {b} and ϕ k (q) p(i) ϕ k (p), hence voter i can manipulate at profile p towards q.
Case
Let q(i) be obtained from p(i) by swapping the positions of the alternatives w and y. By
, proving that ϕ k is manipulable by voter i at profile p towards q.
Best comparison
For the definition of the best comparison preference extension see Section 3.2.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is not manipulable under best comparison.
Theorem 4.2 Let p ∈ P N . The k-approval scoring rule ϕ k is not manipulable at p under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the following three statements holds:
In words, condition (a) requires that the best alternative among the quasiwinners is preferred over all almost quasi-winners; (b) requires that no quasiwinner is among his k first ranked alternatives, but some of the almost quasiwinners are; and (c) requires that the number of the voter's k highest ranked alternatives among the quasi-winners is larger than the number of alternatives that are neither among his k highest ranked nor among the quasi-winners.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For the if-part, let q be an i-deviation of p.
. Assume that at least one of the cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. We show that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.
In case (a), for both cases occurring in (2), we obtain β p
and by the assumption for case (a), we conclude that ϕ k (p) p(i) ϕ k (q).
In case (b), again using (2)
In case (c), it is easy to see that
For this case, note that x ∈ β k (p(i)). By the assumptions for this case we can take a q(i) ∈ P with x ∈ β k (q(i)) and
p) and i can manipulate at profile p towards q.
Stochastic dominance comparison
For the definition of the stochastic dominance comparison preference extension see Section 3.3.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule is not manipulable under stochastic dominance comparison. Its proof is placed in the Appendix. 
In words, these five cases can be described as follows. In case (a), at least one of voter i's k highest ranked alternatives and all of his lower ranked alternatives are quasi-winners. In case (b), no quasi-winner but at least one almost quasiwinner is among his k highest ranked alternatives. In case (c) there is a unique quasi-winner among voter i's k highest ranked alternatives, but there are lower ranked quasi-winners as well. In case (d) there is a unique quasi-winner, which is preferred by i to all almost quasi-winners. In case (e) there is again a unique quasi-winner, and among the almost quasi-winners there are more than m − k alternatives worse than the unique quasi-winner.
The two-voter case
In this subsection we concentrate on the two-voter case and consider the following question: which k-approval rule is least (or minimally) manipulable, under various assumptions on preference extensions as studied in the preceding sections?
We start with a simple theorem, which will be derived from Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, but also easily follows directly. It states that ϕ 1 is strategy-proof, i.e., not manipulable at any profile p.
Theorem 4.4 Let n = 2. Then the 1-approval rule ϕ 1 is strategy-proof under worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison.
Proof. Let p = (p(1), p(2)) be a preference profile and let k = 1. Note that (b) in Theorem 4.1 is always satisfied: this shows strategy-proofness under worst comparison. In Theorem 4.2, (a) reduces to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) and (b) to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)): this shows strategy-proofness under best comparison. Finally, in Theorem 4.3, (b) reduces to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) and (d) to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)): this shows strategy-proofness under stochastic dominance comparison.
This observation might make our quest for minimally manipulable rules futile, were it not the case that the 1-approval rule (i.e., plurality rule) is not unambiguously attractive. As an example, consider the case where voter 1 has preference p(1) : xz . . . y and voter 2 has preference p(2) : yz . . . x (notations obvious). Then ϕ 1 (p) = {x, y} but ϕ 2 (p) = {z}. So it seems that ϕ 2 offers a better compromise in this case than ϕ 1 .
Moreover, for more than two voters and apart from a few particular cases, Theorem 4.4 no longer holds.
We will now consider the three cases (worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison) separately.
Worst comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison are easily described using Theorem 4.1. 
Proof. Case (b) in Theorem 4.1 does not apply. If case (a) in Theorem 4.1 applies then we have |β k (p(1))∩β k (p(2))| = 1 (or, equivalently, |ϕ k (p)| = 1), but this is possible if and only if k ≤ (m + 1)/2. If case (c) in Theorem 4.1 applies then we have |β k (p(1)) ∩ β k (p(2))| = 2k − m (or, equivalently, |ϕ k (p)| = 2k − m), but this is possible if and only if k ≥ (m + 1)/2; but for k = (m + 1)/2 we have 2k − m = 1, so that we are back in case (a).
Denote by η(m, k) the number of profiles (for two voters) at which ϕ k is not manipulable. By straightforward counting we obtain the following result for the number of manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison.
Theorem 4.6 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Consider worst comparison. Then
From this theorem we derive the following corollary (see the Appendix for a proof), which states some facts about k as far as non-manipulability is concerned. (The exact meaning of k * being close to √ m in part (a) is explained in the proof.) The first-best value of k is k = 1 (Theorem 4.4), but ϕ 1 has the drawback that it does not give much opportunity for compromises. Among other values of k, the value k = m−1 is best. We might, however, prefer to have k ≤ (m+1)/2, for the following reason. Call ϕ k citizen-sovereign if for every alternative x ∈ A there is a profile p ∈ P with ϕ k (p) = {x}. It is not difficult to see that ϕ k is citizen-sovereign for any number of voters n ≥ 2 if k ≤ (m + 1)/2. For n = 2 and k > (m + 1)/2, however, ϕ k is not citizen-sovereign. Hence, if we restrict ourselves to citizen-sovereign rules with k ≥ 2, then the best rule is ϕ k * , where k * is close to √ m.
Best comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under best comparison can be derived from Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.8 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider best comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then ϕ k is not manipulable at p ∈ P if and only if either
Proof. If k > m/2 then case (c) in Theorem 4.2 applies to all p ∈ P , and if k ≤ m/2 then case (c) applies to no p ∈ P . This implies part (b) of the corollary, and it also implies that for k ≤ m/2 we only have to consider cases (a) and (b) in Theorem 4.2. It is easily seen that these cases result in the two cases in part (a) of the corollary.
The number of non-manipulable profiles η(m, k) if k ≤ m/2 is computed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2. Consider best comparison. Then
Proof. The first case in (a) in Corollary 4.8 with β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) results in If we require k = 1 and citizen-sovereignty, i.e., k ≤ m/2, then the optimal value of k with respect to non-manipulability, i.e., the value of k that maximizes η (m, k) , is equal to 2.
To see this, note that by Theorem 4.9 and some elementary calculations we have for 2 < k ≤ m 2 :
Since k > 2 it is therefore sufficient to prove that
This simplifies to (4k − 8)m > 5k 2 − 8k − 4. Since m ≥ 2k, it is sufficient to show that 3k 2 − 8k + 4 > 0, which indeed holds for k > 2.
Stochastic dominance comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under stochastic dominance comparison can be derived from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.10 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider stochastic dominance comparison. Then ϕ k is not manipulable at p if and only if at least one of the following holds.
Proof. For n = 2 and k ≥ 2 cases (d) 
non-manipulable profiles, resulting in the second term for η (m, k) .
If k > m/2 then case (a) of Corollary 4.10 is not possible, and (b) is a special case of (c). For the latter case, we just have to count the number of profiles for which [A \ β k (p(1))] ∩ [A \ β k (p(2))] = ∅, since the other condition is always fulfilled. This number is equal to
About the value of k that maximizes η(m, k), so the value of k that is optimal with respect to non-manipulability, we can say the following.
1. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m 2 , the number of non-manipulable profiles decreases with k, and thus k = 2 is optimal.
2. For m 2 < k ≤ m − 1, the number of non-manipulable profiles increases with k, and thus k = m − 1 is optimal.
3. η(m, 2) > η(m, m − 1) for m ≥ 4, so k = 2 is the overall optimal value between 2 and m − 1.
To prove these statements, first assume k ≤ m 2 . Then, using Theorem 4.11(a) and simplifying, we derive
and it is easily seen that the right hand side holds for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m 2 . Next, assume m 2 < k ≤ m − 1. Then, using Theorem 4.11(b) and simplifying, we derive η(m, k + 1) > η(m, k) ⇔ 3k 2 + k(4 − 4m) + m 2 − 3m + 1 < 0 .
The roots of the quadratic expression in k at the right hand side are 2 3 (m − 1) ± 1 3 √ m 2 + m + 1; the smaller root is smaller than m 2 , whereas the larger root is larger than m − 1. Thus, the right hand side holds for all m 2 < k ≤ m − 1. Finally, by Theorem 4.11 again, η(m, 2) > η(m, m − 1) ⇔ m > 3 , so that k = 2 is the overall optimal value of k for 2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1.
Lexicographic worst and best comparison
In this subsection we briefly consider a natural extension of worst and best comparison, namely lexicographic worst and best comparison. These preference extensions to sets are given by the following recursive definition. For two subsets B and C of alternatives, we say that B is (weakly) preferred to C under lexicographic worst comparison by voter i with preference p(i) if 1. C = ∅, or 2. B and C are non-empty and ω(p(i) |B ), ω(p(i) |C ) ∈ p(i), or 3. ω(p(i) |B ) = ω(p(i) |C ) =: w and B \ {w} is preferred to C \ {w} under lexicographic worst comparison by voter i with preference p(i).
The definition for lexicographic best comparison is obtained simply by replacing the worst alternative by the best alternative, i.e., by replacing ω(·) by β(·). Thus, under lexicographic worst comparison a voter first considers the worst elements of B and C. If these are different, then he prefers the set with the better worst element. Otherwise, the voter considers the second worst elements. If these are different, then he prefers the set with the better second worst element. Otherwise, he considers the third worst elements, etc. Similarly, of course, for lexicographic best comparison.
Complete characterizations of the non-manipulable profiles for both lexicographic worst and lexicographic best comparison can be given but are rather technical (even more so than for stochastic dominance comparison) and therefore not included.
Note that any profile that is manipulable under worst [best] comparison is also manipulable under lexicographic worst [best] comparison. Hence, the set of non-manipulable profiles under lexicographic worst [best] comparison is always a subset of the set of non-manipulable profiles under worst [best] comparison. It is not very difficult to check (we omit the proof for the sake of briefness) that all the profiles listed in Corollary 4.5, that is, all two-voter profiles that are non-manipulable under worst comparison, are also non-manipulable under lexicographic worst comparison, so that in this case considering lexicographic worst comparison instead of just worst comparison does not make any difference. The non-manipulable profiles coincide, and the optimal value of k as far as nonmanipulability is concerned, is the same as in Section 4.4.1.
For two voters and lexicographic best comparison the situation is different and the set of non-manipulable profiles is a strict subset of the set of nonmanipulable profiles under best comparison, that is, the set of profiles described in Corollary 4.8. To be precise, we have the following result, which can be derived from Corollary 4.8 (the proof is again left to the reader). 
(b) If k > m/2 then ϕ k is not manipulable at any p ∈ P .
In this case, the total number of non-manipulable profiles for 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2 is equal to
and this number is decreasing in k, so that k = 2 is the value of k that minimizes manipulability subject to 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2, just as in the best comparison case. The proofs of these facts are somewhat simpler than for the best comparison case. For the sake of briefness we omit them.
An asymptotic result
We start with defining the class of all scoring rules. A (normalized) scoring vector is a vector s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ) ∈ R m with 1 = s 1 ≥ s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ s m = 0. For a preference π ∈ P and an alternative x ∈ A let t(π, x) denote the rank of x in the preference π, i.e., t(π, x) = k where k = 1 if {x} = β(π) and {x} = β k (π) \ β k−1 (π) otherwise. For a scoring vector s, a profile p ∈ P N , and an alternative x ∈ A, we denote by the s-score
the total score that x obtains under profile p and score vector s. The scoring rule with scoring vector s is defined by
Clearly, a k-approval rule is a scoring rule with scoring vector s such that s 1 = . . . = s k = 1 and s k+1 = . . . = s m = 0.
Now, in what follows, we fix the number of alternatives m and let the number of voters go to infinity. We will show, formally, that then any two scoring rules lead to the same expected values of the highest score, second highest score, and so on, up to a multiplicative constant proportional to the standard deviations of the scoring vectors: the higher this standard deviation the larger the differences between the expected scores. Since the standard deviation is maximal for kapproval rules with k around m/2, we can conclude by the law of large numbers that the proportion of manipulable profiles is smallest for this rule. 7
In order to derive the announced result, assume that voter preferences are drawn from the uniform distribution over P -that is, according to 'impartial culture'. Let Y = (Y π ) π∈P denote the random vector giving the numbers of voters for each preference (so π∈P Y π = n). Then Y has a multinomial distribution with mean (n/m!)1, where 1 is a vector with all entries equal to 1. Write A = {x 1 , . . . , x m }, then for a scoring vector s the random vector Y gives rise to a random vector of scores X s = (X s 1 , . . . , X s m ) where X s j = π∈P Y π s t(π,xj ) for j = 1, . . . , m. Let
denote the standard deviation of the scoring vector s, wheres = (s 1 +. . .+s m )/m is the mean of s. Proposition 2 in Pritchard and Wilson (2009) asserts that . . . , Z m ) is a vector of independent standard normal random variables andZ = (1/m) m j=1 Z j . In words, this means that the limit distributions of the vectors of normalized random variables X s differ only in a multiplicative constant, namely the standard deviation σ(s). This implies Z s = (σ(s)/σ(s ))Z s for any two scoring vectors s and s . In particular, this also holds for the associated order statistics (Z s (1) , . . . , Z s (m) ) and (Z s (1) , . . . , Z s (m) ), with Z s
(1) and Z s (1) being the (limit) distributions of the highest scores. As a consequence we obtain the following proposition. 
for all j = 1, . . . , m − 1, where E denotes the expectation operator.
Proposition 4.13 implies that the difference in expected value between any two consecutive scores is largest for rules based on scoring vectors with maximal standard deviation. Since the vectors of random variables Z s have the same distributions up to these standard deviations of the score vectors, and taking into account that the probability of all alternatives having distinct scores converges to 1 if the number of voters goes to infinity 8 , we have by the law of large numbers that scoring rules ϕ s with maximal standard deviation σ(s) have the smallest proportion of manipulable profiles. The following result, of which for completeness a proof is given in the Appendix, then implies that the k-approval rule with k around m/2 is least manipulable if the number of voters becomes large. For ease of reference we formulate the main result of this subsection as a corollary. This asymptotic result should be taken with some care, since the probability of being able to manipulate becomes very small if the number of voters grows, and so we are comparing small numbers. On the other hand there is some evidence that already for a relatively small number of voters the k-approval rule with k close to m/2 performs best, at least among the k-approval rules. See Table 3 in the next section.
Some simulation results
Since general comparisons between the approval rule and k-approval rules are complex and hard to obtain, we present here some results of simulations. 9 Table 1 gives the approximate percentages of non-manipulable profiles for the approval rule with 3-10 alternatives and 2, 3, 6, and 10 voters, based on 1,00,000 trials. While the number of trials is relatively low, we nevertheless think that the numbers in the Some conclusions can be drawn from this table. Clearly, the possibility of manipulation increases with the number of alternatives. For more than two voters manipulability also increases from worst comparison to best comparison and from best comparison to stochastic dominance comparison. This is not entirely intuitive at first glance. One might expect that many profiles that are manipulable under stochastic comparison are also manipulable under worst and best comparison, since in order to improve under stochastic comparison a necessary condition is that the worst and best alternatives of a set should not decrease in preference. Thus, to explain the results in Table 1 , it seems to be the case that manipulation under stochastic comparison is often performed by improving intermediate alternatives. Moreover, apparently this kind of manipulation can often lead to comparable sets, in spite of the fact that stochastic dominance preference is not complete. As a final comment on Table 1 , under worst comparison manipulability seems to decrease with the number of voters, but under the other two preference extensions manipulability first seems to increase and then to decrease again.
In Table 2 we present the results for k-approval rules for 6 alternatives; 2, 3, 6, or 10 voters; and again based on 1,00,000 trials. For comparison the corresponding results for the approval rule from Table 1 Again we see that for relatively high numbers of voters manipulability seems to increase from worst to best and from best to stochastic dominance comparison. Further, for more than two voters the approval rule is outperformed by (at least) the 3-approval rule as far as non-manipulability is concerned.
The final simulation results we present are collected in Table 3 . This table gives the percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules with k odd and the approval rule for 10 alternatives, 25 agents, based on 1,000,000 trials. We give more accurate numbers than in the other tables since some differences are very small. A prudent observation is that the 5-approval rule performs best with respect to (non-)manipulability among the odd values of k (except for the case k = 9 and best comparison) -in line with the asymptotic result in Section 4.6. Also, it performs better than the approval rule. m = 10 k 1 3 5 7 9 Approval rule n = 25 worst comp 67.1 74.4 74.5 70.2 48.8 69.5 best comp 33.5 49.9 50.2 40.9 54.8 37.6 stoch comp 26.6 37.6 37.8 29.7 03.7 29.1 Table 3 : Percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules and the approval rule, m = 10, n = 25, based on 1,000,000 trials.
Concluding remarks
We have characterized all (non-)manipulable preference profiles for the approval rule and for k-approval rules. Our simulation results indicate that k-approval voting may be a good substitute for approval voting. It preserves the simplicity of the voting procedure characteristic for approval voting but tends to be less manipulable. Asymptotically, the k-approval rule with k close to half of the number of alternatives is even best among all scoring rules in this respect. This result is in line with Pritchard and Wilson (2009) , although their context is somewhat different. Our characterizations are also useful for studying 'partial culture' voting, where uniform distribution of preference profiles is not assumed.
Appendix: remaining proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.5. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r, with s(i) = (q(i), (i)).
In case (a), ϕ (r) = ϕ (r −i )∪[ϕ − (r −i )∩β k(i) (w (i))]. If ϕ (r −i )∩β (i) (q (i)) = ∅ then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r −i ) ∪ [ϕ − (r −i ) ∩ β (i) (q (i))] but this is not preferred to ϕ (r) according to w(i) . If ϕ (r −i ) ∩ β (i) (q (i)) = ∅ then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r −i ) ∩ β (i) (q (i)) which again is not preferred to ϕ (r) according to w(i) .
In case (b), ϕ(r) = ϕ(r −i )∩β k(i) (w(i)) and {x} ∼ w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r). If ϕ (s) ⊆ ϕ (r) then ϕ (s) is not preferred to ϕ (r). Otherwise, there are z ∈ ϕ(s) ∩ ϕ(r −i ) with (x, z) ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ ϕ(r). In that case too, ϕ (s) is not preferred to ϕ (r) according to w(i) .
For case (c), note that ϕ (r) ⊆ ϕ (r −i ) and thus, {x} ∼ w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r). Also, {x} w(i) {y} for all x ∈ ϕ (r −i ) and y ∈ ϕ − (r −i ). So ϕ (s) w(i) ϕ (r).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of the three cases (a)-(c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ (r) is manipulable at profile r by voter i. By taking negations it follows that none of (a)-(c) holding is equivalent to all of the following three statements holding for r and i.
It is straightforward to derive that k < k < (m + 1)/2 and k − k < 1. Now statement (a) follows by taking k * = k + 1 or k * ∈ { k + 1, k + 2}, depending on the exact values of k and k.
For m − 1 ≥ k > (m + 1)/2 we have η(m, k) = m! k! k! (2k − m)! by Theorem 4.6. To go from η(m, k) to η(m, k + 1) we multiply by a factor (k +1) 2 /(2k −m+2)(2k −m+1), which is larger than 1 since k +1 ≥ 2k −m+2. This proves statement (b).
To show statement (c) we have to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m+1)/2, where α(m, k) = η(m, k)/η(m, m − 1). By a simple computation we derive α(m + 1, k) = α(m, k) · (m + 1 − k) 2 m 2 (m − 2k + 2) .
Since (m + 1 − k) 2 < m 2 and m − 2k + 2 ≥ 1, this implies α(m + 1, k) < α (m, k) . Hence, to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m + 1)/2, it is sufficient to show α(2k + 1, k) < 1 for all k ≥ 2. We show this by induction on k. For k = 2 we have α(5, 2) = 3/4 < 1. Now assume α(2k + 1, k) < 1 then it is sufficient to show α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1. To show this, by straightforward computation we have α(2k + 3, k + 1) = α(2k + 1, k) · (k + 2) 2 2k · (2k + 1) .
By the induction hypothesis and since (k + 2) 2 < 2k · (2k + 1) for k ≥ 2, we obtain α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.14. Let s be an arbitrary scoring vector. We will prove the proposition for the variance σ 2 (s), and first show that for σ 2 (s) to be maximal every coordinate of s has to be equal to 0 or 1. Let j ∈ {2, . . . , m − 1} be arbitrary and write Differentiating with respect to s j , we obtain after simplification:
This implies dσ 2 (s) dsj > (=, <) 0 exactly when s j > (=, <) i =j s i m−1 . In turn, this implies that with respect to s j the variance σ 2 (s) is maximal for s j = 0 or s j = 1.
Second, let σ 2 (k) denote the variance of the scoring vector associated with the k-approval rule. Then it is simple to verify that σ 2 (k) = (1/m)[k − k 2 /m], which implies that σ 2 (k) is maximal exactly if k ∈ {(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} for m odd and k = m/2 for m even.
The proof is complete by combining the two arguments.
